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Abstract
The object of this essay is to describe and analyse contractual relations in two vil-
lages in North-east Bihar at a time when the so-called ‘green revolution’ promised
much and the region had just started to beneﬁt from canal irrigation. It is against
this historical background that I will examine, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, the
functioning of the markets for labour and tenancies, and their interplay with
those for draught power and credit. Theory sheds much light on why such richly
diverse arrangements prevailed, but despite notable subsequent advances, it still
leaves certain important questions without a fully satisfactory answer.
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1 Introduction
Village studies are no longer in fashion among economists. In earlier times, taking a
leaf out of the anthropologist’s book, detailed inquiries into households’ dealings had
the aim not only of measuring them, but also of understanding why things functioned
as they did – especially when viewed in the context of the village community. A no-
table example is Hopper’s (1965) investigation of whether cultivators in a U.P. village
were proﬁt-maximisers. Two deservedly famous studies involved revisiting the origi-
nal village, the better to understand processes of change and development: Bliss and
Stern (1982), later joined by Dre`ze, Lanjouw and others (1998), have told the story of
Palanpur ; and then there are the six ICRISAT villages in the Deccan plateau, which
have spawned enough literature to ﬁll a small library.
Almost half a century ago, I studied two villages in North-east Bihar. The object
of this essay is to describe and analyse the workings of their markets for labour and
tenancies, at a time when the so-called ‘green revolution’ promised much – and certainly
occupied the attention of academics and practitioners alike. The region had just started
to beneﬁt from the Kosi barrage and its extensive canal system, and new, high-yielding
varieties of wheat and rice requiring irrigation were being introduced on a large scale. It
is against this historical background that I will examine the then prevailing contractual
relations in the light of the theoretical advances that were made in the decades that
followed. In returning to this topic with the beneﬁt of hindsight, I aim to provide an
account not only of how things were in that backward part of the world, but also of
why they were so.
The essay is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out, in a discursive way, some simple
theory in order to provide the scaﬀolding for the empirical account. Certain departures
from the standard Arrow-Debreu model occupy centre stage. Section 3 provides a
sketch of the setting, namely, Purnea district, its climate, pattern of cultivation and
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agrarian structure. The two villages and the sampling procedure are described in
Section 4. With these preliminaries settled, labour contracts are taken up Sections 5
and 6. The former deals with attached farm servants, who were engaged for a year,
and the latter with day-labourers. Tenancy is the subject of Section 7, followed by the
closely related matter of draught power, the market for which was extremely thin, in
Section 8. The pervasiveness of risk, in its various forms, and the ensuing consequences
are discussed in Section 9. Some reﬂections on theory in the light of the world described
by these villages follow in Section 10. The essay closes with brief remarks.
2 Employment and Markets
The term employment, as used here, carries the general meaning of an occupation:
farming as an owner or tenant is just as much a form of employment as ploughing
daily under an annual contract or working on a variety of tasks over the course of
the agricultural cycle as a day labourer. This meaning, rather than the narrower
connotation of working for wages, is the relevant one when describing the economic
organisation of the village economy and attempting to understand why it takes the
form it does. Without a sketch of this structure and how it functions, moreover, any
account of the various contracts between employers and employees will tend to slip into
becoming a mere list of things, full of detail but lacking analytical underpinnings.
In the standard Arrow-Debreu model, in which markets, including those for contin-
gent commodities, are complete and all agents take prices as parametrically given, an
agent’s choice of occupation is superﬂuous. A man who owns 1and can cultivate it
himself, hiring in labour at the going wage as he sees ﬁt; or he can rent it out and work
for others as a hired hand. Another may be landless, but desires to cultivate; so he
rents in some land, perhaps also trading in the labour market. Yet these choices will
have no eﬀect on the value of their respective endowments at the ruling prices.
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In reality, of course, economic organisation, as it arises from such choices, does
matter; and it certainly matters a great deal in an Indian village, even without the
restrictions imposed by caste. The reason why it matters is that some markets are
imperfect and others are thin or even fail altogether. To illustrate with the two villages
in mind, a household which desires to cultivate must have not only a holding, whether
owned or leased in, but also some working capital, in the form of a stock of seed and
a wage fund. It must also have access to draught power, either in the form of animals
of its own or by being able to lease in the services of animals owned by others. Here
the trouble begins; for at that time, the market for the services of draught animals was
very thin.
The reason, brieﬂy stated, lay in moral hazard. Draught animals, like most produc-
tive assets, must be handled with some skill and considerable care if they are to be
kept in good condition, especially over the long run. If a pair of bullocks or buﬀaloes is
rented out to another farmer, who also works them, any resulting injury to them from
carelessness or abuse may well manifest itself only later, when it will be impossible
to establish with reasonable certainty, in law or customary practice, who was at fault.
The owner would therefore feel compelled, in order to protect his interests, to do the
ploughing himself. Owners of draught animals, however, are themselves well-placed to
be cultivators, if only as tenants; in which event, ploughing for others runs into conﬂict
with the demands of their own schedule of operations. Since all farmers are bound to
the same agricultural cycle, those without draught animals could hardly rely on get-
ting such services when they need them – at a price that both they and the potential
suppliers would ﬁnd mutually acceptable. The upshot is that owning draught power is
normally essential if a household is to choose cultivation.
That being so, why do would-be cultivators not simply buy a pair of bullocks? For
trade in animals – as opposed to their services – is often well-established, the problems
of moral hazard being less severe for outright purchases. It is now the failings in capital
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markets, beset as they are by moral hazard and adverse selection, that come into play.
For a pair of bullocks does not come cheaply; so that a poor household, which is almost
surely unable to oﬀer satisfactory collateral, will have scarcely a chance of persuading
a lender to advance even a substantial share of the purchase price. With luck and
prudence, such a household might, at length, be able to buy a cow, or a share in one;
and so, eventually, it might get a male calf, which, if nothing untoward occurs, will be
fully mature three years later. There is still the matter of getting the other animal to
make up the pair; but in the meantime, there is at least the possibility of teaming up
with another household in the same position or exchanging days with a household that
has a bit of draught-power capacity to spare. Even so, this process of adjustment is
tortuously slow.
It was these imperfections in the markets for credit and the services of draught ani-
mals in the two villages that governed the pattern of trading in the markets for tenan-
cies and labour, both of which were very active, and so heavily determined households’
choices of employment in the sense of occupation. As we shall see, some households
owned a little land, but having no bullocks, leased it out; others owned no land, but
owning bullocks, obtained tenancies; and as a further twist, some owned neither, but
obtained small tenancies and access to bullocks and working capital as part of their
annual contracts as ploughmen. These factors, with their resulting inﬂuence on the
organisation of the villages’ economies, were surely a salient feature of north Bihar’s
wider agrarian economy.
To complete these preliminaries, an outline of agricultural labourers’ contracts is
needed. Cultivators engaged workers either by the day or for a whole agricultural
year. In what follows, such workers will be called day labourers and attached farm
servants (AFS), respectively. The terms of their contracts varied not only by the task
performed, but also by the degree of attachment to the employer, whereby some day
labourers were subject to hiring on a ﬁrst-call basis, whenever needed by a landlord who
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had a particular claim on them. The latter typically had allowed some landless to build
their huts on one of his plots, on the clear understanding that he had the right of ﬁrst
call. Piece rates generally ruled for some tasks performed by day labourers, daily rates
for others. The seasonal cycle also had an inﬂuence on rates, independently of the task
involved. AFS contracts involved only a few tasks and their terms were correspondingly
less varied than those pertaining to the daily kinds. As will become clear, however, a
majority of AFS contracts also involved elements of both share tenancy and daily hire
at the prevailing spot wage rate, albeit on a limited scale.
3 The Setting
Purnea district lies in North-east Bihar, which forms part of the Indo-Gangetic plain.
At the time, the district was separated to the east from West Bengal by the Ma-
hananda river; the Ganges formed its southern boundary, the border with Nepal the
northern one; and the neighbouring district of Saharsa to the west had, as its own
western boundary, the river Kosi, an important tributary of the Ganges.1 Even by
Indian standards, the district was – and remains – poor. It also had an unenviable
reputation for backwardness and hazards to health. Buchanan, in his classic reports on
Bihar published between 1809 and 1813, speaks of lackadaisical cultivation. Many civil
servants of my acquaintance seemed to view their posting to the district as something
of a punishment. One common piece of gallows humour ran, ‘If you want to commit
suicide, just come to Purnea and drink the water’. It was rumoured that one District
Collector in the colonial period had kept strictly to whiskey.
The climate is subtropical, with fairly abundant, though somewhat variable rainfall.
1At that time a populous and geographically large district, Purnea was subsequently divided into
four. The south-eastern, north-eastern and northern parts became Katihar, Kishanganj and Araria
districts, respectively, leaving a rump with Purnea town, now Divisional Headquarters, roughly at its
centre. Saharsa suﬀered a similar administrative fate. In what follows, Purnea district will refer to
the undivided administrative unit.
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At the time of survey, the 30-year annual average was 1585 mm,2 with the South-west
monsoon (June-September) contributing all of 1293 mm (Bihar, 1970). The annual
ﬂuctuations are tellingly illustrated by the rainfall in the years 1964 to 1967, the middle
two of which saw all-India droughts that led to famine: 1443 mm, 1291 mm, 1142 mm
and 1117 mm, respectively in total; and 1278 mm, 1180 mm, 865 mm and 1020 mm,
respectively in the South-west monsoon (Bihar, 1968, 1970). The tract’s soils are
largely of the light alluvial type, in many places rather sandy in quality. Although
the landscape appears very ﬂat to the eye, small variations in the topography and the
accompanying soils matter a good deal when assured irrigation is lacking. Crops grown
on up-lying plots, which tend to be sandy, do badly in years of poor rain. Aghani paddy,
which is transplanted in the monsoon months and harvested from mid-November to
early January, was far and away the most important crop. Wheat, pulses and oilseeds
were grown in rabi, followed by jute, maize and bhadai paddy in summer.
Important changes in cultivation were afoot in the late 1960s. This was the beginning
of the promised, so-called ‘green revolution’, which was to be brought about by the
introduction of high-yielding varieties, especially of paddy and wheat. Getting the best
out of them required timely irrigation and heavy doses of fertiliser. The government
was to ensure adequate supplies not only of certiﬁed seed and fertilisers, but also of
the credit needed to ﬁnance their purchase. All the farmers had to do was to adopt
this ﬁne package – and bear the risks it entailed.
By a happy coincidence, the government had also been active on the irrigation front.
During the monsoon of 1953, the Kosi had made another of her sudden jumps to the
west, causing catastrophic ﬂooding and much loss of life. Six years later, a scheme
of 150 miles of embankments designed to conﬁne her to her newly adopted bed was
complete. The second stage involved the construction of a barrage, which was ﬁnished
in 1963, and the third stage completion of a canal system. Water was delivered to
2The 50-year average for 1951-2000 was 1600mm (India, 2016).
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10,000 acres on an experimental basis in 1964-65, rising to about 300,000 acres by the
late 1960s, and then just over 400,000 acres in the agricultural year 1971-72.3 The
real irrigable command at that time was perhaps 650,000 acres (gross), far short of
the newly revised estimate of an ultimate potential of 1.1 million acres – and scarcely
one-third of the original design command (Bell, 1976).
No description of the general setting would be complete without an account of the
prevailing agrarian structure. What is now Bihar was covered by the Permanent Set-
tlement of 1793, which created a class of Zamindari intermediaries between the state
and the cultivator. The Zamindars had the direct legal obligation to pay the land
revenue, which they, in turn, extracted from their tenants, known as Raiyats, in the
form of rents, duly pocketing a share thereof for their troubles. These interests were
abolished soon after Independence, leaving the Raiyats as revenue-paying tenants of
the state – in eﬀect, owners of their holdings. In the course of time, some Raiyats had
leased part or all of their land to others, known as Under-Raiyats, almost invariably on
a sharecropping basis. The Zamindari Abolition Acts therefore removed but the top
layer of a system suﬀused with subtenancy.
Purnea district exhibited all this in full measure. There emerged from Zamindari
Abolition legions, not only of peasant proprietors, a small group of whom were compar-
atively well-to-do and powerful ﬁgures in their respective villages (Wood, 1973), but
also of Under-Raiyats, only a fraction of whom had their status formally recorded, with
all the rights and protections the Tenancy Act conferred. The rest, called Bataidars,
were eﬀectively tenants-at-will of their Raiyat landlords. An oﬃcial report on the
problems confronting small farmers in the Kosi area (Bihar, 1969) provides a detailed
picture.4 Deﬁning small farmers as those cultivating less than 20 acres of unirrigated
land, a limit set so as to allow some variation in families’ economic conditions, a ran-
3The agricultural year runs from July 1 in one calendar year to June 30 of the following one.
4No authorship is attributed, but the moving spirit and organiser was S.K. Chakraverty, the ﬁrst
Kosi Area Development Commissioner, who surely did most of the drafting.
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dom sample thereof was drawn from combined household lists for pairs of villages with
at least 100 such households, the pairs being selected from 14 Blocks. The size dis-
tribution of holdings by cultivators’ tenure status is set out in Table 1. Following the
usage in Bihar (1969), Bataidars are simply called sharecroppers.
The salient features are at once apparent. First, pure Raiyats comprised not quite
one half of the whole sample, though this group’s average holding was somewhat big-
ger than those of the other categories. Secondly, not much land was under recorded
tenancy, and the overwhelming majority of the cultivators concerned also owned land.
Thirdly, pure sharecroppers indeed had small holdings, but made up only 14 per cent
of all cultivators with sharecropping contracts. Purnea’s sharecroppers were, in fact,
overwhelmingly peasant proprietors, who leased in to augment their own holdings. As
for the distribution of the whole land area by status, 74.2 per cent was under raiyatwari
and 23.4 per cent under batai (Bihar, 1969, p.7). What the report did not investigate
was who owned the land leased in. One surmises that many of them were the big
men owning 20 acres or more, but many others surely had more modest holdings. The
schedule contained no questions concerning who actually cultivated the household’s
raiyatwari land, perhaps to avoid spoiling the interviews by raising fears about the
legal consequences of revealing that leasing out was being practised. As will become
clear in later sections, a fair number of those leasing out in the two villages I studied
could not be classed as big men.
4 The Two Villages : Population and Sample
Two villages, hereinafter labelled A and B, were selected purposively from one admin-
istrative block. The proportions of their total cultivable areas that were irrigated were
reckoned to be about 20 and 80 per cent, respectively; but whereas A’s transport links
were good, B’s were rather poor. The Block Development Oﬃcer (BDO) and his staﬀ
9
Table 1: The size distribution of holdings (acres) by cultivators’ tenure status
















Raiyat (R) 9 150 171 132 71 102 57 692
Under-Raiyat (U) 9 4 13
Sharecropper (S) 39 38 12 2 1 92
R-U 11 17 19 7 2 1 57
R-S 4 78 199 147 54 45 5 523
U-S 3 3 1 7
R-U-S 6 19 9 4 12 1 51
Total 13 296 448 322 138 163 64 1,444
Source: Bihar (1969, p.99).
generously conducted a household census of these villages, in which they canvassed the
name of the household head, his father’s name, the numbers of adults and children,
and the family’s landholding, broken down into its irrigated and unirrigated compo-
nents. The size distributions of the households’ ownership holdings, as reported to the
enumerators, are set out in Table 2. At the ﬁrst stage, I drew a 15 per cent simple
random sample from each village: the corresponding size distributions are likewise set
out therein. All the interviews I conducted myself over a period of almost ﬁve months,
ably assisted by the BDO’s eldest son, who acted as both interpreter and local guide.
The questions covered the household’s endowments and its dealings in the markets
for labour, tenancies, draught-power and other farm inputs, together with the full
details of its cropping pattern and the associated cultivation practices, as in a farm
management survey. Consumption was not covered systematically; still less attention
was paid to the more delicate matter of borrowing and lending. The plan was to cover
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the whole of the rabi (January-June) season of the agricultural year 1968-69, and as
much as possible of 1969-70 up to my departure at the end of April 1970. As it turned
out, the task of canvassing the whole sample of 79 households proved to be beyond us
in the time available. We managed to interview 56 of them, most on two, well-spaced
occasions to reduce the interval of recall and check various details, although a few
cultivating households and many of those without land were interviewed but once. At
the close, the record for the entire period from January 1969 to mid April 1970 was
more or less complete for some 40 households and substantially so for another 10. It
was rather fragmentary for the remaining six or so, but still usable for present purposes.
The distribution of these 56 households by size of ownership holding, as reported in
the village census, conformed quite closely to that of their respective villages, albeit
with some over-sampling of those with ample holdings in both villages. There were,
however, a fair number of households whose ownership holdings according to the census
diﬀered strongly from those reported to us: a number of those reporting substantial
holdings in the census round reported even larger ones during the interviews. I shall
comment on these discrepancies as needed below. For the present, it should be noted
that all the households owning 40 acres or more were Hindu joint families, ranging in
size from 15 to 20 members or more.
5 Attached Farm Servants
There were two variants of these contracts. In the more extreme one, the employee
lived in the employer’s household, ate from the ‘common pot’, and so, according to the
standard deﬁnition, was a member of that household. He worked seven days a week
and had to answer his master’s every beck and call. In short, he was a servant; and
that is what he will be called, in keeping with the usage of the time and the need to
distinguish him from those attached farm servants (hereinafter AFS) that did not live
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Table 2: The size distribution of ownership holdings (acres): population and sample












Population 87 75 48 46 14 19 17
Sample:
drawn 17 9 10 0 7 1 3
interviewed 11 6 5 0 5 1 3
per interview 13 3 7 2 1 0 5
Village B
Population 100 25 16 26 10 8 9
Sample:
drawn 20 4 2 3 0 0 3
interviewed 15 3 1 3 0 0 3
per interview 14 0 5 2 0 0 4
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in.5 If an adult, his main job would usually be ploughing, though there were carters,
too; but whatever the main job, he had to undertake other tasks, especially keeping
watch over the household and ripening crops, at his master’s bidding. If a child – and
many were pitiably young – he would tend the cattle or buﬀaloes. In return, the man
received three meals a day, a monthly sum in cash and some items of clothing twice a
year; the boy got his daily meals and clothing, but the cash usually went to his father,
who had indentured him.
Under the second, looser arrangement, the worker did not live in, and so was not
counted as a member of the employer’s household, neither by the contracting parties
themselves, nor according to the standard deﬁnition. Most of these workers were
engaged as ploughmen, who put in six mornings a week for 10 months a year in exchange
for breakfast, a monthly sum in cash and a small plot of land to cultivate in the kharif
season under 50:50 sharecropping. One month’s cash payment (or even a bit more)
would be docked in lieu of sundays; but the ploughman was free to work for a half-days’
wage in the afternoons, if oﬀers came his way. In the remaining two months, namely,
the peak season for harvesting the aghani paddy crop from mid-November onwards, he
was free to engage in the harvest work as a day labourer under the prevailing terms,
though he and his family members might be subject to a ﬁrst call by the cultivator who
had hired him as a ploughman at the beginning of the ploughing cycle (normally, mid-
February). In what follows, such employees will be called ‘other AFS’, to distinguish
them from their more closely tied fellows who lived in.
So much for the two variants in outline. We now turn to the details of the prevalence
of such contracts, the kind of households which engaged in them and the payments in
question.
5Only a single maid servant appeared, as an unnamed employee, in the whole sample.
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5.1 Servants
Since the sampling unit was the household, with an adult male almost invariably as its
head, the only servants likely to appear among households supplying labour were the
children or young teenagers engaged as cowherds. Of the 13 households canvassed in
village A that owned less than an acre, only one supplied a cowherd; of the correspond-
ing 15 households in village B, none did so. Nor, unsurprisingly, did any household
owning more than an acre in either village so indenture any of its children. For an
account of the contracts involving servants, therefore, we must rely on the reports of
the households that engaged them. Five of the six households in village A that owned
at least 10 acres, and all four of those in village B, reported at least one such contract.
No other household did so. These nine households engaged 37 servants in all: Table 3
gives the breakdown by their stipulated tasks.
Table 3: The numbers of servants engaged, by stipulated task
Main task ploughman carter watchman cowherd maid other
Village A 7 2 2 10 1 1a
Village B 2 b 1 3 8 0 0
aA tutor. bOne was a tractor driver.
What wages were they paid? The terms for adults in village A, whether engaged as
ploughmen, carters or watchmen, were Rs15 a month, three meals a day and various
items of clothing, usually given twice a year. The only exceptions were monthly cash
payments of Rs18 and Rs20, respectively, to a carter and a ploughman, by two diﬀerent
employers. For cowherds, the cash payment was Rs10 a month, with the exception of
one employer who paid his only cowherd just Rs5 a month. Although the number of
observations is small, it seems clear, at ﬁrst glance, that there was a going rate for each
job. The payments to the maidservant and tutor, who were engaged by the household
with the largest holding (100 acres or so) in the whole of the canvassed sample of 56,
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are not known.
The payments in kind made up a large part of the total value of the wage. What sort
of fare could a servant expect to have for his three meals a day? No direct information
was gathered; but it is virtually certain that breakfast and lunch were just like those
given to other AFS and day labourers, all of whom took their meals together. In this
connection, there was no dispute among all those interviewed, employee and employer
alike, about the main elements: 250 grams of rice or (wheat) chapatis for breakfast, and
500 grams of rice for lunch. This austere menu might be augmented – and enlivened –
by a serving of 100 grams of dal or vegetables, occasionally even both, to accompany
rice at lunch, depending on the season and tightness in the daily labour market. There
was less agreement among the parties about the exact quality of this improved lunch
and the frequency with which it was provided; as expected, employers made much of
both. Dinner for servants, claimed two employers who happened to remark on the
matter, was just like lunch.
The items of clothing comprised a dhoti, shirt, vest and sometimes a towel, usually
given twice a year and with a blanket in winter. Estimates of the costs were obtained
from three of the ﬁve employers. These diﬀered quite wildly. One employer reported
Rs31 per set twice a year, plus Rs6 for a blanket; the second, Rs27.5 once a year,
including Rs7 for the blanket; and the third, Rs50 per set twice a year, plus Rs20 for
the blanket. What is one to make of all this? As it turns out, there is an indirect
check on the third’s account; for the canvassed sample also happens to include the
household of one of his non-resident ploughman, one of whose sons was indentured to
the employer as a live-in cowherd. The father reported that the cash payment was Rs6
a month, thereby (unwittingly) contradicting his employer’s claim of Rs10 a month –
and added that this sum was paid to him, not the boy. The father’s account strikes
me as the more plausible, and it is tempting to assume that the Rs50 actually refers to
the cost of two sets rather than one. Given this much, and accepting that the blanket
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in question was an especially warm and ﬁne one, we arrive at an annual cost of Rs70,
which is essentially identical to the ﬁrst employer’s, of Rs68 (= 2 × 31 + 6). At the
other extreme, the second employer’s niggardly terms, namely, just one set a year,
departed strikingly from the usual practice in both villages. This might be reconciled
with the other contracts if there was a larger cash payment by way of compensation.
Accepting the second employer’s claim of Rs10 a month at face value yields a combined
annual cost of Rs147.5. The ﬁrst employer reported just Rs5 a month in cash, which
yields a combined annual cost of Rs128. The ‘adjusted’ estimates for the third yield
Rs142. Summing up, it seems that in village A, the going rate in cash and clothing for
a cowherd, who was often a boy not yet in puberty, was worth about Rs11 to Rs12 a
month.
There were fewer observed contracts involving adult servants in village B. The tractor
driver got no less than Rs60 a month, the premium presumably reﬂecting both his skill
and an incentive to take due care of the machine. The other two servants received
Rs12 and Rs15 a month, respectively, roughly in line with their counterparts in village
A. Of the cowherds, four were paid Rs4 monthly, one Rs5.5 and six Rs8, whereby the
latter group’s employer referred to them as teenagers drawn from (attached) landless
labour households which were settled on a plot of his land. It seems likely that the
diﬀerence in these rates lay in the servants’ respective ages, the low-paid being almost
surely young children. The meals provided were exactly like those in village A. All four
employers claimed to have provided two sets of clothing a year, the items also being
exactly those in village A. No estimates of the annual costs thereof are available; but
these cannot have departed much from those deduced above for village A.
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5.2 Other AFS: ploughmen and cowherds
As Sections 2 and 5.1 would suggest, a fair number of adult males reported that they
were employed as ploughmen. For adult males, indeed, this was the only form of ‘other
AFS ’ contract reported by labour households: two in village A and seven in village B.
Both of those in village A actually owned land, each about half an acre; but owning
no bullocks, they had sharecropped out their plots. One of them was mentioned in
Section 5.1: he got three meals a day, worked six full days a week for 10 months, was
paid Rs 15 a month for eight and a half months (the deduction for Sundays oﬀ) and
received two sets of clothing. The other worked seven mornings (half days) a week
for 10 months, received breakfast daily, Rs 8 a month for all 10 so engaged, but no
clothing. He was also free to seek daily work in the afternoons, though this cannot have
been a great comfort. In compensation – one presumes – for his more meagre pay and
the risk of involuntary unemployment after the morning’s ploughing was done, he was
given a small plot of land to sharecrop: 0.6 acres in bhadai (the summer season) and
0.4 acres in kharif, crucially with the landlord allowing him the use of the bullocks and
supplying some seed and an advance of wages to cover the costs of hiring in additional
hands. The pay-oﬀ was, of course, a risky one. The seven ploughmen in village B all
belonged to landless families. All reported half-day contracts like the one in village A,
albeit with minor variations, and all ploughed six mornings a week. Two received Rs
8 a month, with no deduction for Sundays; four Rs 10 a month, one with a deduction
of a month and a half; and the seventh Rs 15 a month, with one month’s deduction.
The plots of land were somewhat larger than in village A: 0.8 acres instead of 0.6 acres
in one season or the other, with the exception of the seventh ploughman, who had 0.4
acres in both. It is interesting that the latter had the same employer as two of the
others.
On the employers’ side, ﬁve households in village A had nine ploughmen under
17
this looser form of contract, one of them engaged for full days; the corresponding
numbers in village B were three households and also nine ploughmen, again one full-
time. There were no ‘matching’ interviews to yield an exact check; but the contractual
terms squared well with those reported by households supplying ploughmen to others.
In village A, one employer paid his four ploughmen at the rate of breakfast, Rs 8 a
month (deduction unknown) and a total of 1.2 acres spread over two seasons; another
paid the same, but allocated just 0.4 acres in each season. Two other employers paid a
more generous Rs 15 a month, but one of them allocated just 1 acre of land. The ﬁfth’s
full-time ploughman got his three meals a day, Rs 9 a month, two sets of clothing and,
surprisingly, 0.4 acres to sharecrop in bhadai. The terms in village B were similar. One
employer paid his ﬁve ploughmen the monthly cash rate of Rs 10 (deduction unknown),
with 1 acre to sharecrop in each of the two seasons. Another paid his three ploughmen
the same monthly rate, with one month’s deduction for Sundays, with an allocation of
1.2 acres in total. The third’s full-time ploughman was contracted for 6 days a week
over the whole 12 months, for breakfast and lunch daily and Rs 10 a month for 10
months, but without clothing or land to cultivate.
Four of the ﬁve said employers in village A had holdings of at least 20 acres; of the
three in village B, one had 13 acres, and the other two 50 acres or more. The exception
was the one in village A whose terms seem to be rather generous. He possessed but
3 acres, and reported that he was dependent on one of his sons for support. It is
likely that poor health prevented him from ploughing himself, and his modest holding
would have placed him in a relatively weak position when bargaining with potential
ploughmen – to the extent that there was any scope for hiring them in this market.
To complete the picture, only one employer reported engaging cowherds who did
not live in, namely, the cultivator in village A who had engaged a single full-time
ploughmen. He reported paying his two cowherds three meals a day, Rs 4 a month and
the standard set of clothing twice a year, terms which are close to those reported by
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the ploughman who had indentured his son as a live-in servant (see Section 5.1).
For the ploughmen, the important question arises as to whether the terms of the
looser contract were suﬃciently attractive to oﬀset the security oﬀered by an engage-
ment as a live-in servant. If they were free to choose, the hypothesis of individual
rationality tells us that this must have been the case. Yet this answer seems a bit pat.
To address the question fully, it is necessary to go into the details of how the market
for day labourers functioned and what income could be derived from sharecropping an
acre or so over two seasons; for the ploughmen with the looser contract were perforce
engaged in both.
6 Day Labourers
The great majority of those who worked for wages were engaged on a daily basis, but
only for a certain set of tasks, as the agricultural cycle dictated. Cultivators or their
AFS did the ploughing and, with the exceptions of potatoes and sugar-cane, the sowing.
Twenty to thirty days after sowing, more hands were needed, either to weed the crop
or to undertake the main task in the monsoon season, namely, to transplant paddy
seedlings. Another weeding might follow some twenty days later; but local varieties of
aghani paddy were rarely weeded. The cultivators themselves almost always dealt with
the tasks of irrigation and applying a top-dressing of fertiliser – the latter investment
seldom made and almost never on unirrigated plots. The crop was then left to ripen,
increasingly watched over as the harvest approached. Hired hands were engaged in
large numbers to cut and bring in the crop, but many cultivators, especially the smaller
ones, threshed the crop themselves. Jute had to be bundled and then transported for
immersion in pools on low-lying land for at least 30 days (an operation called retting), so
that the ﬁbres would loosen suﬃciently for them to be stripped from the stalks. Hired
hands were usually needed at these stages. The same held for the post-harvesting
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operations for tobacco, though it should be recalled that this crop was not widely
grown.
6.1 Wage rates
Two central questions concerning such contracts are, was there a ‘standard’ rate for
each task, and if so, were any deviations from it associated with the season and the
characteristics of the parties involved? The wage rates for transplanting and weeding
were time-rates, as were almost all those for the harvesting, bundling and retting of
jute, and the harvesting of, and the post-harvest operations on, tobacco. Piece-rates
applied to the harvesting of all other crops and the stripping of jute: each labourer
received a ﬁxed share of the gross output he or she brought to the cultivator’s yard.
Another ﬁxed share applied to threshing, and those cutting cane were paid by the
weight cut. These shares were highly uniform (see below), but not the labourers’ daily
earnings. For these rewards depended not only on their individual eﬀorts, but also
on the yields of the plots they harvested, whose levels were the combined outcomes
of their employers’ performance as cultivators and whatever state nature happened to
contribute.
Paddy transplanting constituted a ‘labour-peak’, starting in July with the onset of
the monsoon and ending by mid-September. Wheat and rabi vegetables were weeded
from late December until mid-February, and the main bhadai crops – summer paddy,
jute and maize – from mid-May to mid-June. The harvesting and retting of jute
stretched over the period from late July until mid-February, depending on the variety.
Since oilseeds and legumes were harvested in February and March, wheat in April and
aghani paddy from mid-November until early in January, time-rate operations did not
come into conﬂict with the piece-rate ones of harvesting, except from the middle of
July until the end of August and again late in the calendar year. To this it should
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be added that many plots under bhadai paddy, dacca and maize were subsequently
prepared for transplanting with aghani paddy, a hurried operation that intensiﬁed the
peak in question. It is arguable, therefore, that with these exceptions, time-rates were
not heavily inﬂuenced by the timing of piece-rate operations. It should noted, however,
the parties were not restricted to full-day contracts; for there were two half-day rates,
one each for a morning and an afternoon, respectively, the last rate being the lowest,
albeit for slightly fewer hours, and not so frequently observed. Employers therefore
enjoyed the option of oﬀering full- and half-day contracts, an option that conferred
advantages in scheduling operations and reducing costs in the slacker periods. The
only labourers who might have welcomed such ﬂexibility were the tied ploughmen,
whose contracts left them ‘free’ to search for work in the afternoons.
All time-rates involved payments in kind as well as cash, with the sole exception of
half-days worked in the afternoons, which usually occurred in the short winter days.
The kind component took the form always of breakfast, and frequently of lunch, too. By
all accounts, the former consisted of 250 grams of food-grains, usually wheat chapattis.
Lunch was somewhat variable. At a minimum, it comprised 500 grams of food-grains,
usually rice, and a good measure of salt; but there could be a welcome supplement of
lentils, vegetables or even yoghurt, alone or in some combination, each of 100 grams or
so. Such improvements in quality were more frequent at transplanting time. Employers
made much of them as inducements to attract labourers in the peak season, and most
labourers agreed – though less emphatically – that the quality of lunch was better then.
In view of such variations, arriving at an exact money-value on lunch is impossible;
but three respondents in Village B provided the basis for a persuasive estimate. One
cultivator said he provided his AFS with a regular lunch comprising 625 grams of rice
and 125 grams each of lentils and vegetables, putting the combined cost at more than
Rs1. Another with a fairly substantial holding, but no tied labourers, reported that
his hired hands got the same dish, at a cost of about Rs1, though the quantities may
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have been a bit smaller. A small cultivator, who struck me as a particularly serious
and reliable informant, claimed that the daily rate for hiring a pair of bullocks and
ploughman – if any were available – was at least Rs3 with lunch, or Rs4 without. It
seems safe, therefore, to value lunch at Rs1. If lunch in village A was much like that in
B, this estimate would be consistent with the fact that labourers in village A preferred
the package of Rs0.5 in cash, breakfast and lunch to Rs1 and breakfast, whereas the
converse held for employers.
Two further remarks are in order. First, the preparation of food made claims on
the time and energies of the employer’s womenfolk and the household’s stock of rather
precious cow-dung for cooking. Even if the labourers placed little value on their wom-
enfolk’s time, cow-dung was to be husbanded carefully. Second, while the option to
receive uncooked measures of grains or ﬂour was on the table, very few even referred to
it. Those who did the work almost invariably consumed the meals on the spot. They
could, of course, have made smaller claims on the common pot back in the family hut,
but it seems doubtful that those family members who did not work for wages that
day could expect substantial concessions from those who did – if, indeed, there was
anything in the pot to share that evening.
[Table 4 about here.]
So much for the detailed preliminaries. Table 4 sets out the wage rates by operation
and village, as reported by employers and labourers, respectively. The number in each
cell is the count of respondents who were involved in the operation at the speciﬁed
rate. Some households contributed to more than one cell. To give examples, weeding
potatoes in rabi or summer crops were lean season activities, but weeding irrigated
wheat could overlap with the late phase of the main paddy harvest. Likewise, the jute
varieties dacca and tosa were harvested during the transplanting peak, but mesta in
January or February. The picture has some striking features.
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First, wages were higher in village B. The lowest rate for a full day, Rs1 plus breakfast,
was reported only in village A. When both meals were provided, the cash component
was also frequently lower in A: indeed, its modal value of Rs0.5 was reported but ﬁve
times out of a grand total of 58 in village B. There is also the option of a half day’s
work, which employers regarded as generally cheaper. The half-day rates were the same
in both villages, but whereas such engagements were very common in A, they were a
comparative rarity in B.
Second, viewed as a whole, employers’ reported rates look a bit higher than those
of labourers in both villages – as one might expect. The few instances of both parties
reporting on the same transaction yield a useful check. One big cultivator in village
A reported paying full-day rates of Rs0.5 plus both meals for transplanting paddy and
Rs1 plus breakfast for weeding. These were conﬁrmed by three labourers and disputed
by none. Another cultivator with an even bigger holding claimed almost always to pay
the top rate of Rs1 plus two meals, with a great improvement in the quality of lunch
during the transplanting peak. The sole exception, he added, was paying the standard
rate for a morning’s work weeding potatoes. The former claim was contradicted by
the only labourer in the sample to have had dealings with him: the rate for weeding
was the usual Rs1 plus breakfast. In an interview much later, which covered the rabi
crops of 1970, the cultivator reported engaging labourers only at the half day rate. At
my request, he had also kept a diary of daily hirings from the middle of December
until the end of February: there were no entries for full-day hires. ‘Matches’ for two
big cultivators also occurred in village B. The ﬁrst reported the invariable rate of
Rs0.62 plus two meals, a claim conﬁrmed by four labourers and disputed by none. The
second insisted adamantly that he paid the top rate of Rs1 plus two meals, a claim
contradicted by the only labourer in the sample to have dealt with him: according to
the labourer, he had been paid the bottom rate of Rs0.5 plus two meals. The latter
claim is indirectly supported by a small cultivator, who reported paying the big man’s
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tied labourers Rs0.62 plus two meals. When they were available for hire by others,
a premium rather than a discount would be expected. Further support came from a
labourer tied to another big cultivator, who said that the big man in question paid his
labourers Rs0.62 plus two meals. This labourer added that his own boss had started to
pay Rs1 in cash instead of Rs0.62 from the start of paddy harvesting in November, a
concession made under pressure from his labourers. It is quite possible that other big
men were coming under like pressure at the same time. Perhaps what was adamantly
reported to me as Rs1 in general, had in fact taken hold just before our ﬁrst interview
in December.
To sum up, if one can speak of such a thing as the going rate for the jobs in question,
in village A it was Rs1 plus breakfast for a full day oﬀ-peak and Rs0.5 plus two meals
at peak times, whereas for tied labourers paid by their masters in village B, it was
Rs0.62 plus two meals at all times, albeit with some movement in rabi 1970 towards a
cash component of Rs1.
Third, there were variations within each village. As is clear from Table 4, the wage
rate for transplanting was generally higher than that for other time-rate operations.
Yet there are clear variations both within and outside the peak at transplanting time,
and these must be discussed. As noted in Section 4, big cultivators almost invariably
had a pool of labour from tied or quasi-dependent landless households upon which to
draw when needed, so that those with smaller holdings had to compete for a much
shrunken residual supply at busy times. The data give a hint that the latter had to
pay a premium to labourers engaged in transplanting. Outside this peak, the picture
is only superﬁcially uniform; for as noted above, there were separate rates for a full
day’s work and each of a morning’s and an afternoon’s, respectively.
Turning to harvesting, there was one striking uniformity, namely, the single rate of
one-ninth of the gross yield, with the sole exceptions of potatoes (one-twelfth) and
sugar-cane (Rs 0.25 per maund). For threshing and winnowing, the rate was one-
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sixteenth. What varied, of course, were the daily earnings. A full day put in on a
good crop of aghani paddy would yield a better return than the wage received for
transplanting it in July or August. Then again, harvesting a poor crop of oilseeds or
legumes in the slack time of February or March would entail a few hours of work for
a meagre reward. Some cultivators, indeed, complained that they could not induce
labourers to harvest plots whose yields were very low, which indicates that the rate of
one-ninth was regarded by all concerned as a norm not to be disregarded.
The resulting variation in earnings prompts the question, who had the right to har-
vest a plot? Big cultivators had their captive pools of labourers on ﬁrst call, but even
this source might not always suﬃce. For much of the year, it seems that harvesting
was largely open to all-comers. The great exception was the main crop, aghani paddy:
those households that had transplanted a plot usually had the exclusive right to har-
vest it. As it was explained to me, this gave the labourers an incentive to do the job
well, by planting the fragile seedlings carefully and properly spaced, thus relieving the
cultivator of some of the burden of close supervision while he was also busily engaged in
organising the uprooting of other batches of seedlings from their nurseries or puddling
other plots in preparation for transplanting. This, then, was what has come to be
called an interlinked transaction in labour at diﬀerent dates. Through this contractual
arrangement, the two parties bound their fortunes together, in some measure. How
was it enforced? Several cultivators told me that the labourers themselves kept out
any hopeful intruders, sometimes coming to blows in the process. On the other side,
what happened if labourers on ﬁrst call had turned a deaf ear to instructions to turn
up for transplanting duties? An anecdote supplies the likely consequence. One big
cultivator related that some of ‘his’ people had gone oﬀ to work on the roads instead.
When they reappeared at harvest time, sickles at the ready, he told them that since
they had transplanted on the roads, they were welcome to harvest on the roads. His
account was conﬁrmed by one of the labourers in question, who added that his mother,
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who had heeded the call, was allowed to harvest the crop.
Some idea of the variation in individual earnings from harvesting and threshing a
plot of paddy is conveyed by an operation I witnessed elsewhere in the district in the
company of the cultivator, a man whose western manners and Ph.D. in agronomy from
a Scottish university caused him to cut a distinctly exotic ﬁgure. The plot in question,
of about 2.2 acres in extent, bordered on a river, which regularly overﬂowed its banks
during the monsoon and receded but slowly afterwards. To cope with these conditions,
cultivators sow or transplant so-called deep-water varieties of paddy, which can grow
up to 15 cm. a day, and so keep their heads above water. The accompanying drawback
is that once the supporting waters have largely retreated, the plants tend to lodge
over, exposing the heads to rotting and rats. In fact, the yield turned out to be quite
satisfactory, at almost 16 maunds per acre; but there was extensive lodging and heavy
weed growth, so that harvesting was a relatively onerous job.
Forty-ﬁve labourers working in twenty-two separate family groups took one whole
day to bring in the crop and the next morning to thresh and winnow it, for which
they received a total of 172 kg. of wheat, or 12.4 per cent of the gross yield. Eight
groups comprised a single individual, seven of them females; there were seven pairs,
ﬁve of them all-female, one all-male and a married couple; the ﬁve trios and two
quartets were all-male. The summary statistics for the all-male, all-female and couple
groups are set out in Table 5. The average amounts received by the individuals falling
into these categories were 4.85, 2.23 and 5.0 kg., respectively, with a grand average
of 3.81 kg. The men were clearly much more productive, on average, though there
was a substantial dispersion in both categories.6 Yet age also played a part. Some of
the women looked distinctly old, perhaps prematurely worn out by child-bearing and
6For the plot in question, the story is complete. If, to go further, what happened is regarded as
a set of random draws from some population of labourers’ earnings from harvesting and threshing
paddy in that neighbourhood, perhaps restricted to deep-water varieties, then standard inference can
be employed.
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drudgery. The smallest of all payments went to a woman who could only be described
as a crone. She had heaped a sheaf of paddy around a bamboo staﬀ, and leaning on it
for support, she trampled slowly with her gnarled feet to separate the grains from the
stalks. The men meanwhile were driving pairs of bullocks in circles on the threshing
ﬂoor, or vigorously thrashing thick bundles, grain-heads downwards, against wooden
benches.
It should be noted that averaging within each family group to produce the levels
of individual payments reported in Table 5 suppresses variations in individual levels
of productivity within groups. The table gives a picture of individual earnings un-
der the reasonable assumption that participating members of each family group had
equal claims on the group’s pooled payment. In doing so, it understates variations in
productivity among all those engaged in the task in question.
6.2 Wages: other evidence
It is natural to ask whether the structure of daily wage rates described above held
more widely. The salient system of wage payments by shares in harvesting operations
prevailed over much of Northern India in the early 1950s (India, 1955). Indeed, this
practice held in the much-surveyed West U.P. village of Palanpur some 20 years later
(Bliss and Stern, 1982). Villages A and B seem not, therefore, to have been exceptional
– in this respect at least.
Where the going daily rate for the other main operations in Purnea district is con-
cerned, Wood (1973) reports Rs. 0.5 plus breakfast and lunch, with a combined kind
component of 750 grams, in his study village of ‘Desipur’ in 1971. In several other
villages I visited in 1970, the said rate varied between Rs. 0.5 and Rs. 1 plus breakfast
and lunch. This all suggests a picture of some uniformity, subject to the caveats arising
from the detailed discussion above.
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For the most intensive investigation of wages, one must turn to Rodgers (1975), who
conducted a study of ﬁve villages in 1971, with particular emphasis on the caloriﬁc value
of the wage. In two villages, there was no cash component: a ﬁxed weight of grain was
paid in addition to breakfast and/or lunch, variations in whose quality and quantity
are not reported. In the other three, the cash component ranged between Rs. 0.75 and
Rs. 1, with substantial seasonal variations in one village. As seasonal movements in
the prices of foodgrains were fairly strong, the real (calorie) wage is unlikely to have
been constant in those villages where the cash component was seasonally invariant.
For unless there were oﬀsetting changes in the caloriﬁc value of the meals provided or
appropriate changes in the prices and availability of particular types of foodgrains so
as to keep the money price of calories constant when the cash component was ﬁxed,
the real wage, so deﬁned, would certainly have varied throughout the year and not just
at the seasonal peaks.
7 Tenancy
The heavy concentration of landownership revealed by Table 2 – a few households own-
ing a great deal of land and very many owning little or none at all – would lead one
to expect the classical adjustment through trade, with the former group leasing out
some part of their holdings to the latter group. This expectation is broadly conﬁrmed
by the patterns in Table 6. In both villages, the distribution of operational holdings
by size, taking no account of the small plots leased to AFS as part of their employ-
ment contracts, which can be regarded a form of minor subcontracting, is indeed a
bit less concentrated. Yet there is much more than meets the eye in the modest (net)
reallocations so described; for other forces were also at work, which produced a rather
complicated pattern of transactions.
What can be said at once is that there was a good deal of leasing activity. Two of
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the ﬁve big owners in village A reported leasing out land, 25 acres in all. One of them
owned 10 acres in another village so far oﬀ as to make self-cultivation an unattractive
option. This sub-holding was parcelled out among no fewer than 10 tenants, monitoring
all of whom must have been a substantial task in itself. The other three claimed not to
have leased out any land, but one of them leased in an acre from the biggest landlord in
the whole village. His own holding was overwhelmingly sandy upland, and less than a
third of it was irrigated; the plot leased in was fertile lowland. Only one of the four big
owners in village B reported leasing out – some 10-15 acres in all to ﬁve or so tenants;
and two of the other 21 households claimed to be leasing in from him, one tenancy
comprising 4.1 acres and going back a decade in time. Another household reported
leasing in land owned by one of the other big three.
At the other end of the distribution, four of the 13 households in village A owning
less than one acre leased in an additional acre or two, and two others 3 and 6.6 acres,
respectively; but two others leased out their entire holdings – a mere 0.4 acres each.
Among the 13 owning between 1 and 15 acres, nine were leasing in a total of 19 acres,
and two others were leasing out about 0.3 acres each. Adjustments in village B were
more limited. Two of those households owning less than 1 acre cultivated about three
acres, another nearly nine acres. The other 11 relied on wage labour alone. Four of
those with modest holdings leased in roughly 1 to 2 acres, but two of them also leased
out almost 4 and 6 acres, respectively, the sub-holdings in question being in villages
somewhat far oﬀ. The larger of the two sub-holdings had been legally settled on the
tenant under the Tenancy Act 15 years back, presumably with the rent limited to 25
per cent of the output.
The usufructuary mortgage also put in an appearance; even so, such transactions
were probably under-reported. In village A, four households had each mortgaged out
between one half and one acre, two others had mortgaged in a like amount; four of
the six owned less than 3.3 acres. There was only one reported contract in village B.
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The household had mortgaged out its entire 0.8 acres to one of the big four in the
interviewed sample, but had managed to recover the holding by repaying the loan after
the recent paddy harvest. While under contract, the household had leased back the
land under sharecropping terms – a common arrangement, so I was told. The big man
in question made no mention of any of this.
As noted in Section 3, the overwhelming majority of Purnea’s tenants were peasant
proprietors, i.e., owner-tenants. Those in villages A and B were no exception: all but
three of the 23 households leasing in owned some land, though six of them had holdings
of less than an acre. A striking feature of these dealings is that no fewer than 15 of the
23 had more than one landlord; indeed, 10 had at least three (see Table 7). Since all
the contracts but one were on a sharecropping basis,7 landlords were confronted with
a potentially serious problem of moral hazard. For tenants owning land have clear
incentives to devote their eﬀorts and resources more intensively to their own holdings,
whether they have one, two or even more landlords; and of the nine owning less than
one acre or no land at all, ﬁve had two or more landlords. In other words, at most three
of the 22 sharecroppers can be construed as having had an exclusive contract with a
landlord, in the sense that the latter, and no other party whatsoever, including the
tenant himself, possessed land cultivated by the tenant. This is an awkward ﬁnding for
many of the theoretical contributions to the vast literature on sharecropping, a point
to which we return in Section 10.
The contractual parameters were unswervingly uniform. The landlord received 50
per cent of the net output after deduction of the harvest and threshing shares. If
the tenant and his family took part in these operations, they had the usual claims
to such payments. It was the tenant’s responsibility to supply all inputs needed in
production, whether through the eﬀorts of family labour and his own draft animals,
or through market purchases, the choice being his. With the exception of harvesting
7One landless household was leasing 3 acres from the railways at Rs10 per acre.
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and threshing operations, the landlord reimbursed none of these costs, monetary or
imputed. In short, the tenant’s cost-shares for ploughing, seeds, compost, fertilisers
and pesticides, and all pre-harvest inputs of labour were 100 per cent, whereby not a
single tenant applied fertilisers and pesticides to leased-in plots.
What did vary was the quality of the plots leased in and the duration of the associated
contracts. Taking the latter ﬁrst, the tenants in villages A and B reported a total of
42 and 22 contractual relationships, respectively, the distributions of whose elapsed
times from the start until the time of interview are set out in Table 8. Where the
number of seasons is given, the duration is a minimum: in just over one half of the
cases, the exact start is unknown, but the cultivation data reveal the latest possible
dates. In addition to these dealings, two tenants in Village A reported that a landlord
of theirs had repossessed a tenancy in the course of kharif 1969, after two and three
years, respectively. One tenant in village B reported a repossession after three years.
To sum up, there was clearly some, but hardly rapid turnover.
In fact, landlords had two good reasons to keep leases short. First, by frequently
rotating plots among tenants, they could circumvent those provisions of the Tenancy
Act conferring security and a rental share of one-quarter on registered tenants. Sec-
ondly, the threat that a tenancy might not be renewed at the end of each season should
have been a goad to good performance, thereby mitigating the moral hazard problem
discussed above. Since about one-half of all contractual relationship stretched over at
least two years, it appears that landlords took a rather relaxed attitude to the potential
dangers posed by the Tenancy Act. If this be so, it may have reﬂected their assessment
of the how the legal system operated in practice. It is harder to draw ﬁrm conclusions
about the eﬃcacy of the ever-present threat of non-renewal. One could argue that, in
equilibrium, such threats would not be carried out: tenants would be kept in line and
the costs of ﬁnding others to replace them would keep landlords from making changes.
Yet this seems a little too pat. For a landlord dissatisﬁed with the performance of
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any of his existing tenants did not enjoy the advantage of being able to resort to a
large pool of qualiﬁed candidates with cultivating capacity to spare as replacements,
a drawback made more acute by the presence of other landlords confronted with the
same problem. These peasant proprietors had some bargaining power; however modest
its extent, it surely put a brake on non-renewals – whatever the motive for them.
With output- and cost-shares seemingly quite uniform, the other margin on which
the contracting parties could operate was the quality of the plots in question. The three
essential characteristics deﬁning a plot’s quality are its soil type, its access to assured
irrigation and its distance from the parties’ respective hamlets. Land owned in adjoin-
ing villages was sometimes under self-cultivation or leased to tenants in the owner’s
home village; but land outside this immediate neighbourhood was almost invariably
leased to tenants living close by. Soil type and access to irrigation were substantially
bound up with topography; for at that time, the sole source of irrigation was the canal
system.8 Upland soils were generally sandy and not especially fertile, though some
tracts were sandy-loam. Even if irrigable, many such plots were not properly levelled.
They were, of course, well-drained; but compost and artiﬁcial fertilisers were needed
to get the best out of them, and the supply of water from the canal was not always
reliable. Land at lower elevations tended to be loamy, clayey or a mixture of the two.
Gravity duly did its job if there was water in the canal, but sometimes all too well; for
the engineers had largely neglected the construction of drainage works. As a result,
some low-lying land had become permanently waterlogged, and those plots that did
dry out in the course of the rabi season were subject to assured ﬂooding in kharif, even
in years of normal rainfall.
With these cautionary remarks, the ‘quality’ of the tenants’ owned and sharecropped
8The widespread introduction of relatively inexpensive, private tube-wells constructed out of bam-
boo and coir, which tapped a groundwater rarely more than 10 meters deep, was only just in the
making. For an account of this whole development, placed in its ‘green revolution’ context, see Clay
(1975), Dommen (1975), and Clay and Biggs (1981).
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holdings are set out in Table 9. It should also be recalled that this picture involves
only the 15 and 7 tenants sampled in villages A and B, respectively, which is further
cause not to draw strong conclusions. The proportions of owned and leased-in land
that were irrigated in village A were about one-quarter and one-third, respectively.
(Omitting the potential ‘outlier’ household that owned 25 acres of upland and leased in
an acre of lowland leaves them essentially unchanged.) The corresponding proportions
in village B were both just over one-half. Where elevation and soils are concerned,
lowland plots made up a larger proportion of the total area leased in than that of
owned land in village A, though the substantial area of unirrigated, leased-in land for
which the classiﬁcation is missing leaves the matter in doubt. In village B, this lack
of classiﬁcation is so substantial as to rule out any conclusion. In short, there is no
compelling evidence that tenants as a group were leasing in land inferior in quality to
their own; if anything, it might have been a little better.
8 Draught Power
Cultivation on any scale beyond a household plot and garden requires draught power,
and any household that wishes to cultivate must have an assured supply when needed,
whether through ownership, exchange or hire. In South Asia, such power is produced
by a pair of bullocks or buﬀaloes and a ploughman, or a tractor and its driver. The
traditional ‘technology’ was still utterly dominant in the Kosi command area in the
early 1970’s, but the stirrings of mechanisation were already apparent. None of the big
men sampled in village A owned a tractor, though one of them, frustrated by frequent
breakdowns and the diﬃculty of getting spares, had sold his ancient machine a year
ago. Two of their four counterparts in village B owned tractors; one had just bought
his machine second-hand for Rs.8300.
In order to understand how the need for draught power inﬂuenced cultivation and
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tenancy, it is essential to begin with the work-rates of these two technologies. The local
bullocks were small beasts, a pair of which could draw the ‘country’ plough, a shaped
wedge of wood tipped with a ﬂat steel spike, over a normal working lifetime, but not
the so-called steel ‘Bihar plough’, which was a touted improvement. The consensus
was that a team would normally manage a single ploughing (i.e., in one direction) on
0.40− 0.48 acres in a four-hour day, though one big cultivator in village A put it lower
at 0.32 acres. Up to 0.6 acres a day could be managed when puddling plots for the
transplanting of paddy, the soil being softened by the monsoon rains. A couple of
respondents said that the animals were weaker in winter. To convey a general idea of
what this implied for cultivating, say, an acre of summer crops or an acre of wheat in
rabi, four cross-ploughings were held to be the minimum level of preparation to get a
satisfactory crop. The consensus work-rate implies a total input of 16 to 20 team-days.
By way of comparison, the owner of the second-hand machine in village B reckoned
its capacity at 20 teams of bullocks or buﬀaloes, where it should be noted that most
ploughing by tractor was done with a cultivator, a disc-plough being used normally
only on clayey lowland. The other owner claimed that he sometimes ploughed for 24
hours at a stretch. Perhaps he fortiﬁed himself with a special brew, but there was no
way of overcoming the animals’ need for rest.
At ﬁrst sight, the market for draught-power services in cultivation looked fairly
active. Of the 31 households sampled in village A, 24 (excluding AFS) were cultivating
directly, and of these, only ﬁve engaged neither in hiring in, nor in hiring out, nor in
exchanges. On closer examination, however, a rather diﬀerent picture emerges. Of the
ten households that reported hiring in, three were big cultivators, who made limited
use of hired tractors at peak times for certain crops, chieﬂy wheat. The rate for a
team-day ranged from Rs2 to Rs3 in cash, usually plus breakfast; the rates for tractors
were Rs9 per acre with a cultivator and Rs13 for deep ploughing with a disc. Three
other cultivators, owning no draught animals, managed to cultivate small holdings by
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exchanging their labour for the use of the employer’s teams: the rates were, respectively,
30 days of ploughing for 8 days use, 3 half-days of daily labour for 1 team-day, and 2 full
days for 1 team-day, all as ploughmen on the days hired. Three households reported
hiring out. Another seven reported exchanging with neighbours or relatives, but only
two of these exchanged for the purposes of ploughing up to sowing operations, and this
was forced; for both households possessed but one bullock, and so had to ﬁnd a partner
in similar straits in order to make up a team. The other ﬁve exchanged for threshing
or sowing certain crops, operations whose eﬃciency can be improved by getting them
done in a short space of time.
Village B presented a still sharper picture. Of the 25 sampled households, 14 (ex-
cluding AFS) were directly cultivating, and of these, ﬁve engaged neither in hiring
in, nor hiring out, nor exchanges. Only three of the said 14 hired out: two owned
tractors; the third had a ploughman with a small holding of his own, who had to put
in 3 unpaid days for each team-day’s ploughing on his own plots. Only three hired
in, two of them exclusively tractor services, for which the going rate with a cultivator
was Rs9 per acre. These two were big cultivators; one of them had not yet acquired
his second-hand machine. The third, a small farmer who owned but a single bullock,
enjoyed the comparatively favourable rate of 2 bullock-days for each full day’s work
for his employer, one of the tractor-owners and some sort of relative. Four engaged
in exchanges: one had a single bullock, the others had partners only for sowing and
threshing operations.
Quantitatively speaking, these sundry transactions amounted to very little in com-
parison with the total requirements for draught power in cultivation. In aggregate, the
31 sampled households in village A reported a gross cropped area of 402 acres over the
three seasons rabi 1968-69, kharif 1969-70 and rabi 1969-70. Subtracting the 32 acres
cultivated by others under lease, but excluding all AFS contracts, the aggregate direct
requirement arose from 370 acres. Using the norm estimated and discussed above,
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the implied ploughing requirement was therefore between 5940 and 7400 team-days.
The number of team-days actually hired in for this purpose was a mere 76, or just
about enough for 4.5 acres under the norm. Hired tractors made a bigger, albeit still
very modest, contribution. Forty-two acres of wheat and paddy received a single such
ploughing, which is estimated as equivalent to one cross-ploughing by bullocks. Di-
viding by the norm of four cross-ploughings per acre, we obtain a total contribution
of 10 acres. There were also the three households that exchanged their labour for
team-days: their aggregate gross cropped area was 6.9 acres. Thus, teams of bullocks
hired in or exchanged for labour and hired-in tractors combined to meet the ploughing
requirements of 22 out of the total of 370 gross cropped acres – or just 6 per cent.
The sampled households in village B had a gross cropped area of 200 acres. No house-
holds reported hiring in teams for normal payment, and the two households owning a
single bullock had a gross cropped area of 7.2 acres. The two big cultivators hired in
tractors to prepare land for wheat – in aggregate, the equivalent of a single ploughing
on 19 acres, or 5 acres of gross cropped area when normed. Hiring and exchanging
therefore accounted for about 6 per cent of the total requirement, strikingly enough,
the same as in village A.
Where land preparation is concerned, therefore, the stock of draught animals and
tractors produced an essential intermediate good, which was tradable in principle, but
scarcely traded in practice: the market was thin. This fact had important repercussions
on the market for tenancies. For with sharecropping as the only contractual form, no
household would lease out land to a tenant owning neither draught animals nor a
tractor; and any household considering leasing in would need to match its own stock of
draught power with the size of the operational holding that would result from taking
on a tenancy if such a move were to be proﬁtable. What, then, prevented would-be
tenants from simply purchasing bullocks? The answer lay in the credit market. A
pair of good bullocks – it should be noted that assessing an animal’s quality always
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involved some uncertainty – cost about Rs.500, or about 200-times the daily wage; and
a loan on this scale could not be had without collateral. An enterprising ploughman
who had gained much experience in cultivation under the direction of his employer,
but owned little or no land, therefore faced an almost insuperable barrier to becoming
a cultivator in his own right. Households with a single bullock were still stuck with
exchange arrangements, which enabled both parties to cultivate, but severely limited
their combined operational holding. For their part, those households whose managerial
capacities and husbandry skills were not up to the mark in relation to their landholdings
faced a smaller pool of qualiﬁed potential tenants to whom they could lease out.
Diﬃculties in getting credit also reinforced the thinness of the market for draught-
power services. Some cultivators said that they had sometimes wanted to plough more
thoroughly by hiring bullocks, but lacked the cash to do so. Here, it is noteworthy
that only the big men hired in tractor services; for them, liquidity was much less of a
problem. That imperfections in the credit market arguably had eﬀects of a still more
pervasive kind can be seen by examining the textbook case where credit is a ‘standard’
commodity traded in arbitrary quantities at a parametric price. Would-be tenants
could then borrow to oﬀer rental payments in advance, thus introducing ﬁxed-rent
contracts as an alternative to sharecropping. Nor would there be problems ﬁnancing
the hiring of tractors, whose sheer capacity and spatial mobility promote competition
in the market for their services.
In practice, other adjustments were possible, but they were slow and rather tortuous.
Even very poor households owning little or no land sometimes had a calf. If male, the
animal would be able to plough from the age of about three, thus opening the door to
an exchange arrangement. If female, it would produce calves after reaching maturity;
one or two might be male, and so forth. To give a happy example of such success,
the three bullocks owned by the household renting in land from the railway were all
oﬀspring of a single cow owned much earlier and since deceased. In any event, animals
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have to be fed and cared for, which is a costly business. All in all, tenancy, draught
power and credit were caught up in a complicated interplay.
9 Risks
The catalogue of hazards is weighty and diverse. We begin with the weather – more
precisely, with the rains –, since this had such a powerful inﬂuence on the well-being
of cultivators and labourers alike. As noted in Section 3, annual rainfall averaged 1585
mm, but with substantial variability and very heavily concentrated in the monsoon
months of June, July, August and September. At the all-India level, the good rains
and crops of 1964-65 had been followed by severe droughts in 1965-66 and 1966-67,
which hit the upland tracts of Bihar south of the Ganges with particular force. Many
died there in the resulting famine, and hunger must have been widespread in Purnea
district, too; for the area eﬀectively commanded by the Kosi canal system was still
limited at that time. After poor monsoons in 1966 and 1967, the good one in 1968
led to a recovery. These recent events were surely fresh in the villagers’ minds as they
went about their business at the time of survey in 1969-70, with the great ﬂood of 1953
more likely but a distant memory.
What can be called the common component of monsoonal shocks was undoubtedly
very large, but the resulting eﬀects on output also depended on the elevation of the
land. Low-lying plots were almost always clayey: local varieties of deep-water paddy
usually did well in years of poor rainfall, but could be washed away in ‘good’ ones.
The converse held for upland plots, even those with loamy soils: crops were stunted
or withered altogether when rainfall was meagre, but usually did well when rains were
plentiful. The caveat had to do with timing. For rain also falls outside the monsoon
months, varying sharply in time and place; and these showers – or their absence –
can have a big eﬀect on yields. Heavy rains at ﬂowering time can do much damage
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to crops in any season. Late monsoon showers in October and early November can
reduce the yields of aghani paddy, spoil what is always a substantial investment in a
crop of potatoes and wash away pulses broadcast over the ripening paddy. In 1969,
such showers did much damage to aghani paddy and rabi crops in both villages. Many
farmers complained of poor yields, with some plots washed away completely. Eight
farmers in village A reported a total of 6.9 acres completely lost, comprising 3.8 acres
of paddy, 0.6 acres of pulses, 0.2 acres of wheat and 2.3 acres of potatoes, the last
involving especially heavy investments in seeds, compost, fertilisers and labour. In
village B, three farmers suﬀered a total loss of 7.6 acres of pulses. The bhadai crops
– jute, paddy and maize – need the moisture provided by summer showers; but a
heavy shower just after sowing can result in poor germination, and three plots sown
to jute and maize in 1969 were ploughed over. In a ﬁnal twist, unusually persistent
and widespread downpours in April and May in 1971 so hampered the threshing and
drying of the wheat harvest that much of that crop rotted.
As if all this were not enough, the rains also create the conditions for pests to
thrive. The dense plant populations of monsoonal agriculture are naturally vulnerable
to viral, bacterial, and fungal blights and diseases, as well as hordes of insects in need of
nourishment. These common property ‘resources’ do not plague all cultivators equally,
but the ensuing losses are certainly widespread. They threaten, moreover, to grow with
more intensive cultivation, which makes outbreaks of such epidemics more probable.
The use of pesticides was very sparing in Purnea district at that time. A few of the big
men in villages A and B applied them, but only to commercial crops like sugar-cane,
which had only a bit part in the larger scheme of things.
So much for the natural hazards aﬄicting cultivation. Nor were the man-made ones
to be taken lightly. Bovine livestock was brought in by nightfall, to be guarded against
thieves; but if not harnessed to the plough or cart by day, they ranged freely in search
of fodder, often tended only by a child or juvenile cowherd. According to custom, they
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could graze on the village’s waste land, if any, and grazing on fallow ﬁelds seems to be
have been tolerated. In the wholesale absence of fencing between ﬁelds, the cowherd’s
main job was to keep them oﬀ standing crops, which were so much more inviting than
scanty weeds and stubble. It is no surprise that the animals sometimes succeeded in
munching some of the better fare. In village B, one small farmer reported thus losing
most of one-third of an acre of jute, another all of half an acre of barley; and a big
man suﬀered substantial damage to an acre and a half under high-yielding wheat –
as he put it, the neighbouring plots were fallow and so oﬀered no protection. These
examples vividly illustrate the costs of unenforced property rights when enforcement is
prohibitively costly. Even fenced vegetable plots were not wholly safe. One ploughman
in village A occupied his time in the afternoons with cultivating a variety of vegetables
on sharecropped holdings. He had fenced in a ﬁfth of an acre with materials provided
by the landlord and then sown the plot to peas and chillies. Yet animals later broke in
all the same and devoured the lot. Was it just the cowherd’s carelessness, or perhaps
a deliberate act of vandalism?
Returning to water, the canal system was closed for maintenance in the bhadai season
of 1969. This was properly announced in advance. When oﬃcially in operation, the
system was not always reliable, as a number of cultivators complained. Nor was a
lack of water always the outcome of some impersonal, chance process. It was claimed
during one interview in village A that the engineers were withholding water from the
local tributary at a sensitive phase in wheat cultivation in order to extort some bribes.
I took the opportunity to have a brief word with the Kosi Commissioner a day or two
later, merely indicating that there seemed to be some problem with supply to that
village. Water ﬂowed soon afterwards. Waterworks are a possible source of fun as well
as venality. One big man in village B told that some children had given one of his
largish plots under high-yielding wheat an extra, heavy irrigation, which did the crop
no good at all.
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The theft of animals and standing crops was a permanent concern, and though no
incidents were reported, it must be added that I failed to pursue this topic. One small
farmer in village B, who was not prompted in any way, declared that he was virtually
certain that at least 50 kg of his jute had been stolen from a pool while retting.
Surely not less important than hazards to cultivation were those to health. Purnea’s
reputation on this score has already been mentioned in Section 3, and to have neglected
the topic of health in the investigation was a signal omission. Some respondents men-
tioned in passing that they had been too sick to work for a while at some stage in the
year. While checking on some details in a second interview of one household, it emerged
that a toddler had died since the ﬁrst. As for the animals, Purnea’s environment must
have been as inimical to them as it was to their owners.
Confronted with such an array of hazards, there is every reason to suppose that vil-
lagers must have calculated and acted with much caution in all their dealings, perhaps
to the point of fatalism in some domains. Such a burden of risk surely imposed some
of the burden of their poverty. It seems a small wonder, in some ways, that they were
prepared to try out new things at all.
10 Reflections on Theory
This is not the place for a disquisition on the body of theory related to our topic –
there are already ﬁne surveys, such as Singh (1989) and Otsuka et al. (1992). Rather
my purpose is to sketch a theoretical structure in the light of the foregoing empirical
account, paying particular attention to what assumptions seem to be defensible.
I begin with four general observations. First, the inhabitants of communities like
those considered here know a great deal about each other’s business and doings, includ-
ing their endowments of productive resources. Screening behaviour and its associated
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equilibria can therefore be ruled out as irrelevant. Secondly, the notion that landlords
can both stipulate what tenants are to do and enforce these detailed instructions at
tolerable cost, as vigorously promoted by Cheung (1968), seems far-fetched. They can
certainly inﬂuence the cropping pattern, both directly by negotiation and indirectly by
choosing the quality of the plots under lease, but there are too many other margins
on which tenants can operate to make the full-blown version of private rights doctrine
tenable. Where it does seem quite defensible is in AFS contracts, wherein the plots
in question are small, the contracts are exclusive, and the landlord provides not only
seeds and the use of bullocks, but also supervises the key operations. Thirdly, keep-
ing tenants up to the mark by awarding only short-term leases and making renewal
dependent on satisfactory performance (Johnson, 1950) is certainly an option open to
landlords; but the scale and pace of rotation seemed quite modest in practice, and with
a limited pool of qualiﬁed tenants, there will have come a point where old oﬀenders
had to be considered once more. Fourthly, keeping the tenant to his tasks through an
exclusive contract, as in Stiglitz (1974) for example, was not an option, because the
great majority of qualiﬁed tenants also owned land, and a good majority had more
than one landlord. The conclusion must be that moral hazard was a serious problem,
with potentially substantial eﬀects on allocative eﬃciency.9
It emerges from Section 8 that a key distinction to be drawn is between households
that possess an assured supply of draught-power and those that do not; for only the
former can cultivate independently. In addition to owning draught animals, the former
will possess some husbandry and managerial skills, which can be put to good use only
when the household cultivates directly, there being no market for such skills. Together
with the household’s draught animals, these skills constitute a bundle of non-tradable
factors that are essential in production. The household’s endowment of labour, in
contrast, is fully tradable; but those of its members who possess the special skills in
9See Bell (1977) for empirical evidence to this eﬀect.
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question make no use of them when employed by others as workers. The vital role
of non-tradables in practice would lead one to expect their having a prominent place
in any theoretical treatment of the incidence and terms of tenancy contracts, with
particular reference to the scope for bargaining; but this is not so. Non-tradables
do play a central role in Bell and Zusman (1976), wherein a single landlord lacking
them can deal with n identical landless tenants who do possess them. The very real
complications stemming from the possibility that a tenant owns land and may contract
with more than one landlord are therefore ruled out by assumption.
Those households that lack the requisite non-tradable factors can cultivate only on
the strictly limited scale aﬀorded by an AFS contract. This brings us to the mat-
ter of labour-tying and seasonality. In the standard model (Bardhan, 1983), landless
households can engage themselves to an employer at a ﬁxed wage in both seasons; the
risky alternative is to work as day labourers in both seasons, the peak-season wage
being higher on average, but also variable. The former looks, at ﬁrst glance, like the
contract of a live-in farm servant. Yet only one member of the family is so engaged;
the others work as day labourers, tied in some degree to the employer (one might be
a ploughman), with all the risks that attend it. Even in this case, therefore, risk is far
from banished. The simpliﬁcation in the standard model can be defended as anchoring
the analysis; but it seems rather strong if the aim is to explain the more varied choices
observed in Purnea, all of which involved labour households bearing some risk.
11 Concluding Remarks
The foregoing account can be thought of not only as a pair of miniatures, no doubt
incomplete in certain respects, but also as two small elements of the larger mosaic
constituting the rural economy of India’s lower gangetic plain half a century ago. It
has been argued that the rich array of contractual forms and terms that ruled in both
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villages at that time lends the account a signiﬁcance that goes beyond mere historical
interest. Yet various developments were soon in train that surely threatened to remake
those arrangements, with winners and losers.
First, there was rapid agricultural growth in Punjab and Haryana, which sucked in
droves of Bihari labourers as migrants: better to be exploited there than oppressed back
at home. This improvement in the outside option – in place of the oﬀ-chance of getting
work on the roads – must have had a measurable eﬀect on wages and labour contracts.
Accelerating growth and urbanisation at the national level from the early 1980’s on-
wards would have maintained this general pressure, with the speciﬁc intervention of
NREGS to follow in 2005. Secondly, a principal aim of the 1969 Act nationalising the
banks was to extend organised banking to rural areas. To the extent that it improved
access to credit, it would have had eﬀects on the market for tenancies, including the
contractual terms. Thirdly, the mechanisation of agricultural operations was getting
under way, adding an ‘endogenous’ factor to inﬂuence wage and tenancy contracts.
Fourthly, there was the humble, ‘home-grown’ innovation of the bamboo tube-well,
whose rapid adoption was bound up with the emergence of a market for irrigation
water.
This essay provides the ‘then’, but there is no accompanying ‘now’, only the general
conjectures just sketched. Perhaps there are some younger scholars with a taste for
such an enterprise to undertake it.
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Table 4: Daily wage rates by operation: numbers of employers and labourers reporting
employers labourers
Operation trans. a weed b jute c plant d trans. a weed b jute c plant d
A: full-day
1 + br 9 2 4 5 1
0.5 + br+ ln 10 6 6 3 6 4 6
0.75 + br+ ln 2
1 + br + ln 5 2 3 2 1 1 1
A: half-day
0.5 + br (am) 13 5 3 4 1
0.5 (pm) 1 2
B: full-day
0.5 + br+ ln 1 1 1 1 1
0.62 + br+ ln 3 5 1 1 6 7 6 1
0.75 + br+ ln 1 3 1 2
1 + br + ln 5 4 4 1 1 1 2
1.25 + br+ ln 1
A: half-day
0.5 + br (am) 1 1
0.5 (pm) 1 2
a Transplanting of aghani paddy.
b Weeding, all crops. c Harvesting, bundling and retting. d Planting of potatoes and sugarcane.
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Table 5: Harvest wages (in kg.)a from 2.2 acres of lowland paddy
Groups no. indi-
viduals
mean s.d. min. max
Male only 10 24 4.85 0 1.5 5.2
Female only 11 19 2.23 0 0.8 5.0
Both 1 2 5.0 0 – –
All 22 45 3.81 0 0.8 5.2
.
aTotal payment 172 kg. Share of total output 0.124.
Table 6: The size distributions of ownership and operational holdings (acres)












ownership 13 3 7 2 1 0 5
operational 7 6 4 8 1 0 5
Village B
ownership 14 0 5 2 0 0 4
operational 11 0 8 2 0 0 4
Table 7: Distribution of tenants by numbers of landlords
Number 1 2 3 4 5 + total
Village A 7(5) 3(3) 3(3) 1(0) 2(2) 16(13)
Village B 1(1) 2(2) 2(2) 1(1) 1(1) 7(7)
Numbers in parentheses are those tenants owning some land.
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Table 8: Distribution of current contracts by their duration since start: tenants







Village A 7 10 16 2 5 2 42
Village B 6 2 8 2 3 1 22
The number of seasons denotes, in many cases, the minimum duration since the start of the contract.
Table 9: The quality of tenants’ holdings, owned and leased (in acres)
Type irrigated unirrigated
upland a lowland b n.a. total upland a lowland b n.a. total
Village A
Own land 12.4 1.5 0.2 14.1 33.4 7.7 0.2 41.3
Leased in 6.9 5.0 1.8 13.7 13.9 5.0 9.2 28.1
Village B
Own land 3.2 0 2.0 5.2 0.8 1.3 2.1 4.2
Leased in 0.8 1.0 8.7 10.5 1.5 2.6 5.9 10.0
a Nearly always rather sandy soils, very occasionally sandy loam.
b Mostly clayey, sometimes clayey loam.
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